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Irrigation induced salinity is a serious problem in many countries around the world. In 
Australia, this type of salinity is most pronounced in the valley of the River Murray in 
South Australia. Location of irrigation enterprises has been identified as a key factor that 
needs to be taken into account by policies aimed at mitigating salinity. This article 
compares and contrasts two such policies: an irrigation zoning policy, where new 
irrigation enterprises are only allowed in low salinity impact zones, and an offsetting with 
salinity credits policy, where new irrigation enterprises can locate in high salinity impact 
zones, provided they offset their salinity impact with salinity credits. Key findings are 
that the offsetting policy will be both less costly and more effective in reducing salinity 
than a standalone irrigation zoning policy. This is due to the presence of incentives for 
choosing “optimal” location of irrigation enterprises when costs of salinity credits are 
taken into account.  
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  Irrigation induced salinity has been an inadvertent follower and the ultimate doom 
of many prosperous agricultural systems throughout history. In Australia, irrigation 
induced salinity was identified as a serious problem since the early stages of irrigation 
development (Quiggin, 1988). This problem is most pronounced in the valley of River 
Murray in South Australia (ibid). Various technical solutions have been devised to 
control irrigation induced salinity, including dilution flows, salinity interception schemes 
etc. (Heaney et al. 2001, Connor, 2004). The importance of spatial location of irrigation 
enterprises has also been noted and policies have been devised that mandate or provide 
incentives for irrigation developments to locate in areas where they would cause less 
salinity impact (Gordon et al., 2005; Duke, 2004). Most recently, an irrigation zoning 
policy has been implemented that restricts the location of new irrigation development to 
areas where salinity impact is relatively low. New irrigation developments in high 
salinity impact areas are prohibited. This zoning policy is likely to reduce the salinity 
impact but it will also increase aggregate irrigation costs for the region. Since typically 
the low salinity impact zones are located further away from the river channel, zoning will 
increase aggregate costs of irrigation as a result of higher water delivery costs due to 
increased costs of piping and pumping water.  
An alternative to this standalone zoning policy would be to implement an 
offsetting scheme, whereby the salinity impact from new irrigation development in the 
high salinity impact zones will be offset by reduction of salinity impact elsewhere. This 
gives rise to salinity credits. Trading in salinity credits will reduce the salt impact, while 
reducing the overall costs of compliance to the irrigation industry.   
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  The primary objective of this paper is to determine whether implementing an 
offsetting system of tradeable salinity credits in the South Australian Riverland can 
reduce the costs of achieving long term salinity impact reductions as projected under the 
standalone irrigation zoning policy. This is done by comparing the costs of both 
standalone irrigation zoning policy and the offsetting policy. Since the relative spatial 
location of irrigation enterprises along the river channel has significant meaning—
upstream irrigation has greater salinity impact than the downstream irrigation— an 
additional objective is to determine the effect of the salinity offset scheme on the spatial 
location of new irrigation developments.  
  This study builds on prolific literature on environmental offsetting using credits 
for non-point source pollution (e.g Shortle and Horan, 2001; Randall and Taylor, 2000; 
and Stavins, 2000).  The problem of irrigation induced salinity in Australia has also been 
widely explored from an economic perspective (Quiggin, 1988 and 2001, Heanney et al. 
2001). Alternative policies to address irrigation induced salinity with a particular focus 
on the River Murray and South Australia have been recently analysed by Connor et al. 
(2004) and Connor (2004). The present paper goes beyond these studies to formulate a 
theoretical framework for salinity credit offsetting scheme and to empirically test the 
derived theoretical results. 
 
Theory 
  Let us consider a region surrounding a river which can be delineated into a 
number of analysis areas. Each of these areas has a high and low salinity impact zone 
defined within its realms. Classification of high and low impact zones is based on the  
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potential to contribute to long term river salinity through salt load from these zones. 
Within each zone there is current irrigation activity, and also new irrigation activity can 
potentially be developed. 
 The cost of water delivery is assumed to differ across analysis areas and between 
salinity impact zones. Irrigators located further from or higher above the river channel 
(i.e. in low impact zones) face higher water delivery costs resulting from higher fixed 
costs (piping) and higher operation costs (pumping) . Salinity impact resulting from an 
irrigation development is assumed to be higher if the development is located further 
upstream, as it impacts greater number of downstream water users.  
 
Unregulated irrigation development 
  To establish a baseline, consider a situation where the location of new irrigation 
developments is not restricted. In the absence of regulation, the problem from irrigation 
industry’s perspective is to maximise overall profits, Π, by choosing where to locate new 
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The choice variable,  z a H ,  represents the number of hectares of new irrigation 
development that are established in analysis area a and impact zone z.  The set A contains 
the analysis areas, and is so ordered that a lower number indicates that the analysis area is 
located further downstream. Z represents the set of impact zones, and C represents the set  
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of possible crop types. pc is the price of crop c; yc represents the yield of crop c; OCc 
represents the costs of irrigated production for crop c excluding the cost of water delivery 
and application;  z a WSC , represents the average water delivery and application cost for 
area a and salinity impact zone z; and  c a d ,  represents the proportion of crop c that is 
currently produced in a, where  1 0 , ≤ ≤ c a d  and  1 , = ∑
∈C c
c a d .   
  The problem stated above is constrained by the maximum number of hectares on 
which new irrigation development can take place each year in the whole region and by 
the maximum number of hectares of new irrigation development in the individual 
analysis areas and zones. In the ensuing empirical study these constraints were based on 
water availability projections and long term observed trends.    
  Maximizing the objective function in Eq. (1) subject to the stated constraints 
would result in a solution that reflects the tendency to locate as close as possible to the 
river channel, driven by the difference in water delivery cost. This is consistent with 
reality, as a major proportion of irrigation is located within the high salinity impact zones 
of the South Australian Riverland (21,500 ha. in high impact zones and 9,400 ha in low 
impact zones).   
 
Irrigation zoning 
  The introduction of a zoning policy prevents new irrigation development from 
locating in high impact zones, which effectively adds an additional constraint to the 
problem presented in Eq. (1). Under this policy, all new irrigation has to locate in the low 
impact zones and hence the overall regional profits are:   
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where 
Z
a Π denotes profits in any analysis area a under the zoning policy.  
 
Offsets using salinity credits 
  Under an offsetting system, irrigation can take place in both low and high salinity 
impact zones. From the irrigation industry’s perspective the problem may be formulated 
as: 
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where  credit p  is the price of a salinity credit, and Sa,z=H represents the salinity impact per 
hectare of irrigation located within the high salinity impact zone of analysis area a.  
  For simplicity, and in order to match annual demand with the annual supply of 
credits rather than having to match demand and supply of salinity credits over the lifetime 
of an irrigation development, we assume that salinity credits are leased out on an annual 
basis. The suppliers of credits are existing irrigation enterprises located in the high impact 
zones that could redevelop through a normal replacement of portions of their crop 
enterprises that have come to the end of their productive life. They can proceed with this 
replacement and thus continue to have a negative salinity impact, or they can choose not 
to replace and hence obtain salinity reduction credits. They can then sell these credits to 
the developers who would like to develop new irrigation enterprises in any high salinity 
impact zone.   
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Demand for salinity credits 
  Differentiating Eq. (3) with respect to Ha,z  yields:  
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Equating (4) and (5) and solving simultaneously gives: 
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where p*a,credit represents the maximum amount that a developer would be willing to pay 
for salinity credits in analysis area a.  For any credit price less than this maximum 
amount, pcredit < p*a,credit , a developer of a new irrigation will choose to buy the offset 
credit and to locate within the high impact zone of a . This will yield them: 
Z
a H z a y H z a credit H z a c
C c
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T
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where  ,
T
az H = Π  is the profit under the salinity offsetting scheme (superscript 
T ) in area a, 
and  
Z
a Π is the profit under the standalone zoning policy (superscript 
Z ) in the same area. 
When the credit price is equal to the maximum amount, pcredit = p*a,credit, a developer of 
new irrigation will be indifferent between locating in the high or the low impact zone.  If 
the credit price is greater than the maximum amount the developer is willing to pay for 
credits in a, pcredit > p*a,credit, then new irrigation will locate in the low salinity impact 
zone, and obtain a profit equivalent as under the standalone zoning policy. This enables 
us to state the following result:  
 
7
Result 1: Under an offsetting system with tradeable salinity credits, assuming negligible 
transaction costs, the profits obtained from a new irrigation development in each analysis 
area are at least as large as those obtained under irrigation zoning.   
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We can proceed by looking at the demand for salinity reduction credits in area a, 
d
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  Salinity impact resulting from new irrigation development is assumed to be higher 
for areas located upstream, that is:  n S S S ≤ ≤ ≤ L 2 1 . This is because the salt load from 
irrigators further upstream affects relatively more downstream users (irrigators, 
municipalities, industries), as compared to the loads coming from downstream irrigators. 
Assuming that the difference in water delivery costs between the high and low impact 
zones across all areas is the same, we can infer that the maximum amount developers are 
willing to pay for salinity credits will be higher for areas further downstream, than for the 






n,credit. This enables us to state the following 
result: 
Result 2: When the distribution of crop types in each area along the river is constant, that 
is  , ac c dd a A =∀ ∈ and  cC ∀∈ , and the difference in water delivery costs between  
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the high and low impact zones is the same across areas, salinity credits will be demanded 
by all downstream areas,  {1, , } aj A ∈⊂ L , for which the credit price is lower than the 
maximum amount that developers are willing to pay for salinity credits in those areas, 
,1 , j credit credit j credit pp p
∗∗
+ >≥ . 
 
Supply of salinity credits 
  Every year, a certain portion of the irrigated land within the high impact zone is 
due for redevelopment because it has come to the end of its productive life. In the 
presence of an offsetting scheme with salinity credits, the irrigators can choose whether 
to replant or to supply credits. If the irrigators choose to replant they obtain the profit 
from redevelopment red H z a H z a c c c c a
C c
H WSC OC y p d , , , , ) )) ( ( ( = =
∈
⋅ − − ∑ . If the area is not 
replanted, irrigators are entitled to salinity credits, which they can sell and obtain a payoff 
of  ,, aa z H r e d c r e d i t SH p = ⋅ . Following a similar procedure as in the analysis of the demand, we 
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where  , ac r e d i t p
∗∗
 represents the ‘threshold supply price’ for salinity credits, above which no 
irrigation is redeveloped in a, and the maximum number of salinity credits are supplied; 
and below which all land in a is redeveloped and no credits are supplied.  This enables us 
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Similarly to the demand for salinity credits, the higher the salinity impact resulting from 
irrigation development in an area, the lower the ‘threshold supply price’ above which 
salinity credits will be supplied to the market. Since the salinity impact is greater for 
areas located upstream, and assuming that the distribution of crop types across areas is 
constant, we can infer that the ‘threshold supply price’, above which credits are supplied, 






n,credit. This leads to the 
following result: 
Result 3: When the distribution of crops across areas along the river is constant, 
, ac c dd a A =∀ ∈ and  cC ∀∈ , and when water delivery costs in the high impact zone 
across areas are the same, salinity credits will be supplied by the k upstream areas, 
{ } 1, , an k n A ∈− + ⊂ L  for which the credit price is higher than the ‘threshold 
supply price,  p
**




Methods and data 
  The South Australian Riverland has been delineated into seventeen Land and 
Water Management Plan (LWMP) areas for the purposes of this analysis. This is 
presented in Figure 1. Each area is classified into a high impact zone (z = H) and a low 
impact zone (z = L), except two— Monash only has a low impact zone and Gurra Gurra 
Lakes only has a high impact zone.   
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 Irrigated  agriculture in the region is composed of five major crops: almonds, 
grapes, oranges, apricots, and potatoes. In 2005 these crops represented 85% of total 
irrigated agriculture in the region by acreage. Yields, prices, fixed and variable costs for 
these crops were obtained from LMLF (2005). Average crop water requirement and the 
costs of both existing and new water licences were obtained from the same source. The 
impact of river water salinity on crop yields was obtained from Lantzke and Calder, 
2005. Water delivery costs were calculated based on average distances and elevation of 
various analysis areas, costs of piping and electricity costs. The salt load and the salinity 
impact from each of the areas under a given distribution of crops were obtained from 
CSIRO PERU (2002).  
  Based on this data, profits and salinity loads were calculated for each crop in each 
zone of each analysis area. These were then fed into a linear programming model that 
was run under three scenarios: a baseline scenario, where no restriction on new irrigation 
development has been imposed; an irrigation zoning scenario, where new irrigation could 
only take place in low salinity impact zones; and a salinity credit offset scenario, where 
irrigation can locate in high salinity impact zones provided the salinity impact is offset.  
  For each scenario, the objective functions corresponding to equations 1, 2 and 3 
were maximised subject to the appropriate set of constraints as discussed in the theory 
section. The demand and supply functions for salinity credits were parameterized by 
varying the price of salinity credits and repeatedly resolving the program for each 






  Under the baseline scenario, most new irrigation development located in the high 
impact zones. The overall annual profit from irrigation activities for the whole region 
under this scenario was AUD 3,665,231. The salinity impact under this scenario was 
calculated to be 4236 EC units over the next 100 years. Even though this might be a 
considerable overestimate because of the “representative” nature of the salinity impact 
across areas, an overall salinity impact under this scenario will be substantial under any 
circumstances. 
  Under the standalone irrigation zoning scenario all new irrigation had to locate in 
the low impact zones. The overall annual profit from irrigation activities for the whole 
region under this scenario was AUD 3,183,113. The salinity impact under this scenario 
was calculated at 338 EC units 100 years after development, which is considerably lower 
compared to the baseline scenario.  
Under the offsetting with salinity credits scenario, new irrigation can be located 
both in low and high salinity impact zones, provided that the salinity impact from new 
developments in high impact zones are offset with salinity credits. The overall annual 
profit for the whole region under this scenario was AUD 3,290,627. Net salinity impact 
under this scenario was calculated at 288 EC units, 100 years after development. The 
equilibrium quantity of salinity credits was 144 EC units, with an associated equilibrium 
price of AUD 606 per EC unit. A trend of locating in both high and low salinity impact 
zones but somewhat downstream, as compared to the previous two scenarios was 
observed. In essence, the developer would choose to locate further downstream whenever 
the reduction in profits, as a result of the impact of higher irrigation water salt  
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concentration on yield, are less than the costs of buying additional salinity offset credits 
to locate upstream. This trend of locating downstream is responsible for the result of 
obtaining lower net salinity impact under offsets as compared to the salinity impact under 
standalone irrigation zoning.  Results for all scenarios are summarised in Table 1.  
 
Discussion 
  Results obtained from simulating the three scenarios indicate several important 
findings. One is that the location of irrigation enterprises has to be addressed in some way 
in order to prevent excessive salt load into the River Murray. A regime of unrestricted 
irrigation development will result in extremely high salinity impact. The economic 
benefits from such laissez-faire policy are not significant as compared to the other 
policies considered. A standalone policy that will rigidly restrict the location of new 
irrigation developments will result in significant reduction of the salinity impact. 
However, the cost of this policy will be higher than the cost of alternative policy that 
allows offsetting of salinity impacts. 
  An offsetting policy with salinity credits achieves a significant reduction of the 
overall salinity impact level, and at lower cost. While costs savings relative to a 
standalone zoning policy are not enormous (about AUD 110,000 per anum), the reduction 
of salinity impact of the offset policy is in fact superior compared to the standalone 
zoning policy. This is a result of greater flexibility in location choices. Given the 
substantial costs of salinity credits, new irrigation developments will tend to locate in the 
areas where relatively fewer credits will be required. This tendency results in a lower net 
salinity impact under the offset policy.   
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Summary and conclusion 
  The paper addresses the problem of choosing policies for mitigating irrigation 
induced salinity at least-cost. Since the spatial location of irrigation enterprises plays a 
key role in determining the salinity impact of those enterprises, policies that restrict the 
location choices have been proposed and implemented to address the problem. One such 
policy is the irrigation zoning, recently adopted in South Australia. The paper compares 
this to an alternative policy, where the location of new irrigation enterprises is not 
restricted per-se, but any new developments in areas that are designated as “high salinity 
impact” are required to purchase salinity credits for offsetting.  
  Key theoretical findings are that offsetting policy will be as profitable as 
standalone irrigation zoning policy in any analysis area, and that the salinity credits will 
be demanded by the downstream irrigators and supplied by upstream irrigators. These 
results were tested in an empirical study. The study simulated three scenarios using linear 
programming methods: a baseline scenario of unregulated irrigation expansion, an 
irrigation zoning scenario and an offsetting with salinity credits scenario. The results 
suggest that both irrigation zoning and offsetting policy will do much better in terms of 
salinity impact as compared to the baseline scenario, and will do so at very reasonable 
costs. Direct comparison of the standalone zoning and offsetting scenarios however show 
that offsetting policy achieves both better salinity outcome and at lower cost than a 
standalone zoning scenario. 
  Several conclusions can be drawn from the above discussion. Influencing the 
location of irrigation enterprises in order to mitigate irrigation induced salinity, either by 
quantity regulation, as presented here, or by price regulation (Gordon, 2005; Duke,  
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2004), is a sound policy option. However, a pure quantity regulation in the form of 
irrigation zoning is going to be more costly and less effective in achieving reduction of 
salinity impact, as compared to more flexible, incentive based policy. An offset policy 
using salinity credits is one such policy, and the tests conducted here showed that it is 
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Table 1. Costs, salinity impact, quantity and price of salinity credits under the three 
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( mill. AUD) 
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(EC increase projected 









irrigation   0  0  4,263  0  0 
Scenario 1:         
Zoning with no 
offsets 482,118  7.4  338  0  0 
Scenario 2:        


































Figure 1. Analysis areas in the South Australian Riverland.  
 